To what extent may an historic nation impress its religious identity on the public space of its society? For example, does it have a right to ban the wearing of hijabs in schools, to insist on the display of crucifixes in school classrooms, or to ban the construction of minarets? My aim in this article is to critically examine the answers which liberal nationalism gives to these questions, focusing in particular on David Miller's version of this theory. His key claim is that the religion associated with the historic nation may legitimately be given a predominant place in public space. After outlining the principal elements of Miller's position, I shall criticise the general principle on which it is based, before challenging his views on several particular issues. My conclusion will be that, whilst the historic nation has the right to express its religious identity in the public space of its society to some degree, this right is significantly more constrained than Miller believes. Constraints are derived in particular from consideration of the particular nature of different kinds of public space, and consideration of what people need from such spaces, including the need for spaces in which they can express themselves and in which they can feel at home.
Introductory remarks
To what extent may an historic nation shape the public space of its society in its own image?
This question as it stands raises a series of issues too large and complex to attempt to answer in a single article. In order to make it more manageable, I shall focus on just one aspect of it. Assuming that there is an historic nation which is strongly associated with a particular religion, 1 I shall ask: to what extent may this nation impress its religious identity on the public space of its society? One important reason for focusing on religion is that it is at the centre of a number of recent and ongoing controversies, including, for example, those concerning restrictions on the wearing of hijabs and burqas in hospitals, university campuses and open public spaces; regulations concerning the display of crucifixes in public spaces, including in school classrooms and parliament buildings; and the Swiss ban on the building of minarets. 2 Applying the general question posed above to these particular issues, it may be asked, for example, if the historic nation has a right to ban hijab-wearing in schools, if it may insist on the display of crucifixes in school classrooms, or if it may legitimately ban the construction of minarets.
Clearly these are very important questions for nearly all contemporary societies, in which a multiplicity of faiths exist side by side, even where there is an historic nation which is strongly associated with just one of them. Whilst these questions may be answered from a variety of perspectives, my aim in this article is to critically examine the answers given by liberal nationalism. This is a political perspective which combines a commitment to liberal principles with a belief in the importance of national identity. In some variants, it is argued that a shared sense of national identity is the foundation of social solidarity which in turn is necessary for the stability of liberal principles. 3 It is worth focusing on liberal nationalism in part because it is an influential position in contemporary political theory, with staunch defenders and as well as impassioned critics, but also in part because variations on this position are frequently found in contemporary politics itself. Many people think that nations are permitted to shape their own societies in certain ways, although subject to certain limits.
As I say, several contemporary political theorists explicitly espouse forms of liberal nationalism, including David Miller (1995) and Yael Tamir (1993) . In this article, I shall focus 3 in particular on Miller's theory of liberal nationalism (1995, 2000, 2007, 2011, 2016a, 2016b) . This is because his is the most sophisticated and influential version of this theory currently available, and also because he has given considerable thought to the place of religion in his theory (see in particular 2016a). On this particular subject, Miller defends the principle that the historic nation may 'legitimately give precedence to the artefacts of a particular religion when decisions about the use of public space are taken ' (2016a: 454) . For example, he contends that a Christian majority may insist that crucifixes -and no symbols of other faiths -should be displayed in school classrooms; and that, although a general ban on the construction of minarets cannot be justified, permission to build them may be denied if this is necessary to protect the predominance of the Christian faith in public space. 4 My aim in this article, then, is to determine the proper extent of the historic nation's right to impress its religious identity on the public space of its society, and to do so by critically examining Miller's position on this issue. My argument will be that there are reasons for thinking that the nation's exercise of this right should be significantly constrained. I shall not make this argument by introducing constraints on the right to control public space which are entirely external to Miller's liberal nationalism. Rather my strategy will be to suggest that it is possible to draw certain arguments out of his theory which, if suitably and reasonably reinterpreted, can provide reasons for constraining the ability of the historic nation to exercise this right. To be specific, I shall suggest that constraints may be derived from consideration of the particular nature of different kinds of public space, and consideration of what people need from such spaces, including the need for spaces in which they can express themselves and in which they can feel at home.
In the next section, I begin by outlining the principal elements of Miller's position. In the section after that, I suggest that there are three rather different ways of understanding his central principle, and I then criticise each of them in turn. The section that follows challenges Miller's position on several practical issues, criticising his view that the historic nation has a right to insist on the display of crucifixes in classrooms, and rejecting his account of the specific circumstances in which permission to build minarets may be denied.
In the final section, I draw the various strands of my argument together in order to conclude that there are clear limits to the right of the historic nation to impress its religious identity on public space. 4
Miller's argument
As a liberal nationalist, Miller believes that there are both 'intrinsic' and 'instrumental' reasons for thinking that it is desirable to develop and sustain a sense of national identity (2007: 37-8, 125) . With regard to intrinsic reasons, Miller believes it is 'clear that many people have a strong subjective interest in retaining [national identities], and therefore in preserving the means by which they are reproduced over time ' (2016a: 449) . So far as instrumental reasons are concerned, he argues that national identity 'serves important political aims, helping to stabilize democracy and to promote social justice ' (2016a: 448 There are, moreover, two specific sets of circumstances in which the permission to build a minaret may legitimately be denied. First, the proposed minaret could 'become the dominant feature of the town-or cityscape by virtue of its size or height ' (2016a: 451; and see 2016b: 149) . Second, if there is only one spire in a village, then a new minaret would constitute 50% of all tall pointy religious buildings in that area, putting 'the two religions on an equal footing as far as public space is concerned ' (2016a: 451) . In both cases, the historic nation would be harmed since the predominance of its religious identity in public space would be lost.
It is important to emphasize, however, minaret construction does not necessarily undermine the predominance of the historic nation in public space. In this case, although individuals and groups are not entitled to construct minarets by right, their requests to construct such buildings may not always be legitimately turned down. In other words, a general ban on minaret building -especially one given constitutional standing -cannot be justified. Such a ban does not just favour the majority faith, but actively disfavours a minority faith by removing from it a liberty which at least some members of that faith wish to exercise as a manifestation of their religious identity. This could only be justified if the 6 exercise of that liberty would necessarily harm the predominance of the historic nation.
Since it does not do so, a general ban cannot be justified (2016a: 451-2).
Having said this, Miller does mention two possible reasons for thinking that a general ban could be justified. First, 'only a full ban would provide a sufficient safeguard in the cases mentioned above' since 'local planning committees are not robust enough to turn down culturally damaging proposals ' (2016a: 451) . In other words, a national ban may be justified in order to prevent local political bodies giving permission to build minarets in circumstances which would tip the balance away from the historic nation's faith. Second, 'there is potentially a collective action problem whereby a series of individual decisions that allow minarets to be built produce an unanticipated change in the character of public space across the land ' (2016a: 452) . Thus a national ban may be necessary to prevent a number of local decisions being taken, each of which, although harmless in itself, may nevertheless contribute to a significant accumulative harm to the historic nation. 7 However, Miller puts these two arguments aside, leaving it up to his readers to 'form their own view about the plausibility of such arguments' (2016a: 452).
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The liberal nationalist principle in theory I now want to critically examine the general principle on which Miller's position is founded, according to which the historic nation has a right to be 'dominant ' (2016a: 439, 448-49, 451) or to take 'precedence' (2016a: 448-52) in public space. In this section, I shall argue that there are three rather different ways of understanding this principle, and that each of these is problematic in various ways. At the same time, I shall contend that, against Miller's own intentions, each of these different ways of reading his principle actually suggest reasons for constraining the ability of the historic nation to shape public space.
The contribution argument
According to what may be considered the primary way in which Miller's principle should be understood, it is because the historic nation has created the distinctive public space of its 7 society that its members are entitled to enjoy all of the benefits that living in such a space brings them. As he says: 'When a people with a distinctive national culture occupy territory over time and transform it to meet their needs, they acquire the right to preserve and enjoy the value they have thereby created ' (2016a: 448) . I shall call this the contribution argument, since it stresses that it is in virtue of the historic nation's dominant contribution to the shaping of public space that it should continue to have a dominant role in the shaping of it.
Before going any further, it should be noted that the way in which action, through which they are able to transform the territory that they occupy; and (3),
following (1) and (2), these nations can be held responsible for the transformation of their territory, a responsibility which can be inherited by later generations of these nations. My disagreement with Miller, then, only concerns the implications of his theory for the control of public space. To be specific, I deny that it follows from his account that the historic nation has a right to public predominance of the kind he claims for it. To take one of the examples with which I am concerned, I deny that the Swiss nation has a right to ensure that the appearance of public space remains predominantly Christian in character.
In order to explain why I disagree with Miller, I shall begin by offering reasons entirely internal to his own account for thinking that not just the historic nation but also Swiss
Muslims should have a role to play in the shaping of public space. Let me begin by noting 8 that Miller's account is grounded on facts about occupation and transformation: 'As a result of occupation and transformation … the territory becomes a repository of value for the people in question ' (2011: 258) . If these facts are important, then it is relevant to point out that Muslims have been present on Swiss territory for some time, and have as a result effected certain significant changes to the appearance of its public space. So far as occupation is concerned, it may be noted that modern Switzerland was only established as a federal state in 1848, some 170 years ago. By contrast, significant Muslim migration into Switzerland began in the 1970s, nearly fifty years ago. I would argue that, if the historic nation's period of occupation gives it a certain claim to control its territory, including the appearance of public space, then Swiss Muslims' shorter but still significant period of occupation should also give rise to a similar -albeit lesser -claim. With regard to transformation, it is worth pointing out that the first minaret was constructed more than fifty years ago in 1962, and that there are now a total of four minarets and over one hundred mosques in Switzerland. 11 In parallel to my point about occupation, I would argue that, since Swiss Muslims are responsible for changing the shape of public space to some degree, it follows that they should continue to have some role in its future transformation.
To be clear about what I am claiming here, I would not deny that the Swiss historic nation has a greater claim to enjoy the value of public space than Swiss Muslims do. My argument is simply that, if facts about occupation and transformation are normatively significant, then these facts give the latter group some claim to enjoy that value.
I now want to introduce the strategy that I shall rely on for most of the rest of this article.
This involves taking particular elements from Miller's theory, and then showing that, if they are reworked in a certain way, they can provide reasons for thinking that the historic nation's right to impress itself on public space should be significantly constrained. This strategy seems to me to be the best way to convince those sympathetic to Miller that his position on the particular issue of public predominance is mistaken. Before starting to put this strategy into practice, I should say that, if my interpretation and reformulation of these elements of his position were found to be unpersuasive, then I would adopt a different strategy. This would be to formulate my own account of the criterion of need, and then to apply it to the cases with which I am concerned, without suggesting that this account could be found in some form in Miller's own theory.
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My initial point of leverage, then, is the idea of need which Miller invokes when seeking to explain why the nation has a right to enjoy the enhanced value of the territory it has occupied and transformed. Thus, in the quotation towards the start of this section, he says that the nation has such a right since it has altered this territory in such a way that it now meets its 'needs ' (2016a: 448) . On the strongest version of this argument, the claim is that, if this territory 'is now taken from [the group in question], they will no longer be able to sustain their way of life ' (2011: 259) . The point I want to emphasize is that the nation does not have the right to enjoy the enhanced value of its territory simply because it has been there a while and made some changes to it. Rather, it has this right because the changes it has made have had the specific effect of making this territory one which meets its needs. Now, if the brute facts of occupation and transformation alone grounded claims about the right to control public space, then Miller's argument could only be countered by offering an alternative account of occupation and transformation. This is what I sought to do just above, when describing the significance of Muslims' presence on Swiss territory. However, if an idea of need is also normatively significant, then this changes matters. This is because the argument from need can be generalized: if it is good for the historic nation to have a public space which meets its needs, then it must be good for other groups to have that space meet their needs too.
This claim, as it stands, may not convince those sympathetic to Miller, who may reassert the argument that the facts of occupation and transformation mean that only the needs of the historic nation should count, or at least that its needs should enjoy higher priority over those of all other groups. 12 I would disagree, contending that the logic of the argument from need is different from that of that argument, so that claims about need can be detached from those about occupation and transformation. In order to make good on this claim, however, I shall need to explain why groups other than the historic nation also need a public space of a certain kind. This is what I aim to do in the next two sub-sections.
The expression argument
According to a second way of reading Miller's principle, the historic nation has a right to impress its own distinctive values and identity on the fabric of public space: 'a majority is entitled to ensure that the appearance of public space reflects its own cultural values, so that where those values reflect a Christian heritage, it can insist that Christian buildings and symbols should remain hegemonic ' (2016a: 448) . I shall call this the expression argument since it concerns the right of the historic nation to express itself in public space. Now, if this way of expressing Miller's principle was taken in isolation, it would appear to say that a majority has a certain entitlement to express itself publicly simply in virtue of being a majority. Just after this quotation, however, Miller does introduce his argument about occupation and transformation in order to suggest that it is these factors which give the nation the right to ensure that its forms of public expression remain hegemonic. I nevertheless want to argue that this argument from expression does make a distinctive claim about the significance of the historic nation's control of 'the symbolic character of national territory' (2016a: 449) or its ability 'to shape public space in a way that reflects its identity ' (2016a: 454) . To be specific, the claim is that the historic nation's ability to express itself to this extent is vital because its members 'come to understand their own historic identity partly through their direct experience of the environment they and their predecessors have created'. Miller claims, further, that 'the value that is created by preserving this heritage is the value of national identity itself ' (2016a: 448) . In other words, it is through the exercise of its ability to shape public space in its own image that the nation comes to know itself and to reproduce its identity through time.
The point I want to make is that, like the argument about need, this argument about expression can also be detached from considerations of occupation and transformation: it is not because of what the historic nation has done in the past, but because of what it needs going into the future, that its ability to express itself in public space is important. My claim, then, is that this argument about expression can also be generalized: if it is good for the historic nation to have a public space which reflects its identity, thus facilitating its selfunderstanding and enabling it to continue through time, so it is good for other groups too.
Put negatively, if members of minority groups are unable to see themselves reflected in the public space of their society, then their ability to understand themselves and to survive over time will be significantly diminished.
If it is accepted in principle that it is not only the historic nation which has a need to express itself in public space, are there nevertheless other arguments which could be used to deny this right to certain minority groups? To take one of the cases with which I am concerned, could it be argued that there is good reason not to allow public expression in the form of minaret-building? One possibility would be to argue that certain buildings (or other features of public space) express the 'wrong' sort of message, and that this gives us some reason not to permit their construction. In order to briefly consider this possibility, I shall assume that the 'wrong' message is one which suggests that some people's basic rights should be undermined or which declares that some people are of lower civil status than others.
One problem with this argument is that it is often very difficult to determine the meaning of particular features of public space. In some cases, certainly, the significance of certain symbols is clear. When a swastika is daubed on the wall of a Jewish synagogue, the meaning of that sign is beyond reasonable doubt. However, in the case of minarets, their Are there other reasons for denying minority groups the right to public expression? Let us say that there is a consensus about the message which a particular building conveys, and that, even though it is accepted that this message is not 'wrong' according to the standard I have just suggested, it is nevertheless a message which does not accord with the values of the historic nation. In cases like this, I would suggest, the state can respond to the public expression of values with which it disagrees in ways short of banning them. To put it in the briefest possible terms, it can permit the construction of certain buildings -thus respecting this somewhat unusual aspect of the right to public expression -but at the same time speak out against all views it disapproves of, including those which it believes may such buildings express. 14 The conventional way of thinking about state speech in this context assumes that includes measures such as campaigns against racism. But, in the present context, it is worth considering whether the state's counter-speech might also include encouraging or funding the construction of buildings which express the 'right' sort of message, including, for example, public libraries with cafés in which halal and kosher food can be prepared, hospitals with multi-faith spaces of contemplation, and museums representing the multifaith character of their locale or their broader society. My conclusion is that Swiss Muslims should not be denied the right to public expression in the form of the construction of minarets, both because it is not clear what meanings are expressed by minarets, and because the state can respond to forms of public expression with which it disagrees without banning them.
The alienation argument
There is yet a third way of reading Miller's principle, one which emphasizes the idea that members of the historic nation may rightfully expect to find the public space of their society familiar to them. To see why, note his claim that 'people ... want the places they live in and enjoy to look both beautiful and familiar' (2016a: 447). As it stands, this desire for To be specific, it suggests that the feeling of being 'at home' in the social institutions and physical environment of society is one of the most important goods of national identity.
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Hence this argument from alienation concludes that public space should be shaped in a way which makes it a familiar environment for members of the historic nation.
I want to claim that, in virtue of the distinctive logic of this argument from alienation, it follows that, like the two previous arguments, it can be generalized: if the historic nation has an interest in having a public space in which it feels at home, then other groups have such an interest too. If members of the historic nation should be able to feel a strong sense of connection to their polity, 16 then so should others who do not identify with that nation. To put it negatively, and in parallel with my earlier claim about the importance of expression in public space, there appears to be no good reason to privilege the historic nation in this regard. As Matteo Bonotti puts it, when discussing what he calls 'symbolic religious establishment', 'I cannot see any qualitative difference between the alienation of religious and non-religious citizens ' (2012: 347) . In the case with which I am concerned, if members of minority groups were to feel alienated from the public space of their society, then their collective wellbeing would be significantly diminished, just as it would be for members of the historic nation. In short, if alienation is important, then it is important for everyone.
What criticisms might be made to this argument from alienation, especially in the generalized form that I want to defend here? One criticism raises a fundamental objection to any such argument. It contends that, since it relies on an account of how people happen to feel about particular states of affairs, it fails to provide an objective test for the validity of their claims about those states. As Sune Laegaard puts it, 'a literal reading of the alienation account allows idiosyncratic sensibilities to influence the judgement whether institutions are problematic or not ' (2017: 123) . It follows that whether or not the citizens feel 14 connected to the public space of their polity should have no bearing on arguments about what form that space should take. In this case, neither the historic nation nor minority groups could claim that they should have a certain say in the shaping of public space by claiming that this is necessary to prevent their alienation.
In response, I do not think that feelings of familiarity or alienation should be disregarded. This is because the subjective feelings which a person or group has to their social environment will play a significant role in the determination of their overall wellbeing. This objection should be taken seriously since it does indeed seem likely that there is no particular form that public space could take which would enable members of all groups to feel equally at home in it. However, I do not think it follows that no solution can be judged better and worse than others in terms of degrees of alienation. Compare three scenarios:
(1) the religious buildings of the historic nation have a dominant place in public space; (2) the building of all religious groups -and those of non-believers 18 -have a public presence roughly in proportion to their significance in that society; and (3) public space is unmarked by the buildings of any religious or non-religious worldviews. I think that, judged in terms of alienation, there are reasons to think that (2) is the best solution.
(1) enables members of the historic nation to feel at home in public space, but is likely to alienate everyone else. (3) may be welcomed by secularists of various kinds, but all religious citizens are likely to feel alienated from that public space. But (2) enables all citizens to see something of their own religious or non-religious identities on public display. My hunch -and it is no more than this -is that a person gains more from seeing their own buildings in public space than they lose from seeing others' buildings in that space too. The public presence of their own buildings helps them to feel at home there, and this is a feeling which is not entirely undone by the presence of buildings with which they do not identify. My conclusion, then, is that a third way of reading Miller's principle, one which emphasizes the importance of feeling at home in public space, suggests that the feelings of members of the historic nation about this space should not be favoured over those of members of minority groups.
The liberal nationalist principle in practice
In the previous section, I sought to argue that the right of the historic nation to impress its religious identity on the public space of its society should be significantly limited. I now want to consider relatively briefly what implications my argument has for the three particular cases which I described earlier on. If I am right to say that Miller overestimates the extent to which the historic nation may shape public space, what does this imply for his views on hijab wearing, crucifix display and minaret building?
Hijab wearing
In the first of these cases, Miller argues that, although the historic nation may rightfully expect to dominate public space, this expectation does not prevail over the right of Muslim women to wear hijabs in such space. I want to discuss this particular case fairly briefly, since I agree with Miller's position. I just want to add that it would be strengthened by further reflection on the nature of the right to religion. To be specific, it is worth emphasizing that this right entitles individuals to manifest their religious beliefs and identities in public as well as in private. To take one very well-known example, Article 9.1 of the European Convention of Human Rights reads as follows:
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance (Council of Europe, 1950).
If it is understood in this way -as I think it should be -then the right to religion bears could arguably be regarded as touching upon several rights … the concept seems far-fetched and vague' (ECtHR, 2014: separate opinion, para. 5; see also Edwards, 2014; Laegaard, 2015; Marshall 2015) .
Crucifix display
Turning now to the second case, Miller believes that his principle gives strong support to the right of the historic nation to insist on the display of religious symbols -such as crucifixesin the classrooms of state-funded schools. Here it appears that all three ways of reading
Miller's principle -in terms of contribution, expression and alienation -work together to support his position. In the Lautsi case, for instance, the argument would be that, since the Italian nation has created the public spaces of its society -including its schools -it may legitimately expect that such spaces will continue to reflect its identity above all others, and thus to be a familiar environment for its members.
In order to explain why I think that in this case In the case of state schools, we can say that they have a very specific function, which may be construed most narrowly as the education of children, and more broadly as the forging of citizens who in the future will be expected to play a full part in the life of their multi-faith societies. One way of fleshing out this account is again by referring to the European Convention, but this time to Article 2 of Protocol 1 which states that all people have a right to education. In the Lautsi case, the Grand Chamber offered the following interpretation of this article:
as its aim is to safeguard the possibility of pluralism in education, it requires the State, in exercising its functions with regard to education and teaching, to take care that information or knowledge included in the curriculum is conveyed in an objective, critical and pluralistic manner, enabling pupils to develop a critical mind particularly with regard to religion in a calm atmosphere free of any proselytism (European Court of Human Rights, 2011: §62).
If we put aside issues to do with the content of curricula and methods of teaching, and focus on the idea that the right to education requires 'a calm atmosphere free of any proselytism', does this imply anything for the physical environment of state schools?
In order to answer this question, it is important to take note of three particular features of the practice of crucifix display. First, a religious symbol fixed to a classroom wall is a constant and inescapable feature of that space. Second, the schoolchildren affected in this case may be regarded as a particularly vulnerable audience since their desires and preferences are still in the process of being formed. 20 Third, it is natural to understand such a symbol in such a location as an expression of the state's official endorsement of the religion with which it is associated. 21 In my opinion, it follows from this account of mandatory crucifix display that this practice is highly likely to undermine a school's proselytism-free environment. As a result, I also think that it is likely to undermine what Howard Caygill and Alan Scott, discussing the Bavarian Crucifix Order, characterize as schoolchildren's 'right to a self-determined development of religious or philosophical conviction ' (1996: 509) . My conclusion, therefore, is that this practice should not be permitted since it violates the standards that should be applied to schools regarded as a special kind of public space.
I shall end my discussion of this case with two brief notes. First, I should acknowledge that in the Lautsi case the Grand Chamber did not in the end take the principle of nonproselytism to have the implications which I have drawn from it. This was partly because it accepted the Italian government's distinction between 'active' and 'passive' symbols, and its claim that, since crucifixes are passive, they do not have the proselytising effects which critics have attributed to them. In response, I would deny that a coherent distinction between these two types of symbol can be made. After all, why would the Italian government want crucifixes in classrooms if it thought they had no effect on those present (Mawhinney, 2012; Perez, 2015) ? Second, I should also acknowledge that my argument as it stands only provides certain pro tanto reasons to oppose the practice of crucifix-display.
In principle, the historic nation's right to predominance could still outweigh these reasons in an all-things-considered judgement about the merits of this practice. In response, I would say that, in my opinion, this is highly unlikely to happen once the several constraints which I suggest need to be imposed on this right are taken into account.
Minaret building
In the case of the Swiss minaret ban, Miller argues that, since the historic nation created the public space of its society, and is therefore entitled to dominate that space and so feel at home there, it can rightly deny permission to build any minaret which would undermine the its predominance, either by overshadowing its religious buildings or by having a disproportionate presence relative to them. Third, permitting minarets to be built in sensu stricto public space does not imply that the state endorses Islam -as would be the case if, for example, it funded the construction of buildings associated with the historic nation's religion.
In light of this account of minaret construction as a practice which occurs in stricto sensu public space, I can see no good reason to prohibit it. To put it negatively, since this kind of public space lacks the very specific functions of state-funded schools, there is no good reason to try to ensure that it has 'a calm atmosphere free of any proselytism'. To put it positively, it is vital for members of all groups in society to enjoy some measure of influence over the appearance of an open public realm in which they are able to express themselves, and in which they are therefore able to feel at home.
Concluding remarks
I have tried to cover quite a lot of ground in this article, critically analysing three distinct
ways of understanding what I have referred to as Miller's liberal nationalist principle, and also showing why I disagree with the way in which he applies this principle to several particular cases. There is no doubt that there is plenty more that could be said, both about the general principle and about these various cases. But I think that the breadth of my argument has been justified in order to provide a broad overview of the range of issues at stake.
My overall thesis has been that Miller's principle would give the historic nation an unwarranted degree of influence over public space. In order to argue this, my general strategy has been to argue that there are certain elements in Miller's own theory which, if reinterpreted in what I believe is a reasonable way, can provide reasons for imposing constraints on that right. To my mind, these reasons coalesce to form an account of what people need in the different sorts of public spaces in their society, especially the ability to express themselves and to feel at home in those spaces. Hence my conclusion is that a number of constraints should be placed on the right of the historic nation to impress itself on public space. 23 At a practical level, I agreed with Miller that hijab-wearing in public spaces should be permitted, since this practice is protected by that part of the right of religion which enables individuals to manifest their religious identities in public space. But I argued that the historic nation does not have a right to insist that the symbols of its religion are displayed on classroom walls, given the nature of schools as a special kind of public space. Finally, I
argued that permission to build particular minarets could not denied even if this threatened the predominance of the historic nation's faith, since to do so would be to deny other groups an reasonable share of stricto sensu public space.
In closing, I would readily acknowledge that the main tenor of this article has been negative, since its principal objective has been to present a critique of Miller's right of the historic nation to dominate public space. Having said this, by arguing that there are several significant reasons for constraining the exercise of this right, I do think I have given some indication about how I think that the appearance of public space should be determined, and how in particular it needs to reflect the diversity of its society. Elaborating and defending that claim is a task for another day. 1 Whilst this is without doubt a significant assumption, I do not think that it limits the scope of my argument only to situations in which it holds true. On the contrary, although I do not have the space to justify it here, I believe that the analysis I present in this article can be applied mutatis mutandis to other situations in which there is, for example, more than one historic nation, or one nation with two religions, or one nation whose religious identity has changed over significantly time, and so on.
